Model Context Protocol (MCP)

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Connect any client and build a secure remote MCP server: transports, auth (Bearer/OAuth), the five primitives, and the failure modes that actually bite. 20 pages, every claim checked against the sources — 72 refuted claims removed along the way.

• Building an MCP Server: SDKs, Tool Schemas, Testing, and Deployment — the practical path from a 15-minute local prototype to a hosted remote server
• Enterprise MCP Integration Patterns — the Gateway Layer and the Build-vs-Buy Call Before You Ship a Server
• MCP Apps: Server-Rendered UI Extensions — how a tool call returns an interactive interface the host renders inside the conversation, and what keeps that iframe from taking over
• MCP Clients and Hosts: Claude, Cursor, VS Code, ChatGPT, Gemini — What 'Any Client' Actually Means
• MCP Registry and Server Discovery — how a developer finds, publishes, and vets a server before trusting it enough to connect a client
• MCP Tasks — running batch jobs, CI pipelines and human approvals without blocking the connection
• MCP vs Native Function Calling — deciding whether a tool integration is worth turning into a server
• MCP Architecture: Host, Client, Server, and the JSON-RPC 2.0 Wire Format
• Authorization in MCP: OAuth 2.1, Token Scoping, and the Confused-Deputy Problem — securing a remote server on the first attempt
• MCP Session Lifecycle: the Handshake a Client Must Get Right — and the One Being Removed in 2026-07-28
• MCP Core Primitives: Tools, Resources, and Prompts — who is allowed to invoke what, and what a server must declare to offer it
• MCP Transports: stdio for Local Servers, Streamable HTTP for Remote Ones
• What Is the Model Context Protocol (MCP): the Open Standard Connecting AI Models to Tools and Data
• From Anthropic Project to Linux Foundation Standard: How MCP Left Vendor Control
• Origins and Development of the Model Context Protocol: From Internal Frustration to Public Launch
• MCP Limits: Confused Deputy and Overbroad Permission Scopes — why a server you built safely can still act with someone else's authority
• MCP Limits: Prompt Injection and Tool Poisoning — why the primitives a working server relies on are also its attack surface
• MCP Limits: Registry Trust and Supply Chain Risks — why 'it's in the registry' is not a safety guarantee before you connect a client
• MCP Adoption and the July 2026 Spec — what changed under you while you weren't looking